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PRISONER’S DILEMMA ON REAL SOCIAL NETWORKS: REVISITED
SHARON M. CAMERON AND A. CINTRO´N-ARIAS
Abstract. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game theory model used to describe altruistic be-
havior seen in various populations. This theoretical game is important in understanding
why a seemingly selfish strategy does persist and spread throughout a population that
is mixing homogeneously at random. For a population with structure determined by
social interactions, Prisoner’s Dilemma brings to light certain requirements for the al-
truistic strategy to become established. Monte Carlo simulations of Prisoner’s Dilemma
are carried out using both simulated social networks and a dataset of a real social net-
work. In both scenarios we confirm the requirements for the persistence of altruism in
the population.
1. Introduction
One well-documented example of altruism is food sharing. Vampire bats (Desmodus
rotundus) have nocturnal schedules, they leave their roost for several hours during the
night in search of prey they can feed from. On following nights, it is customary for them to
locate the prey they had previously fed on and continue their extraction of warm blood. A
handful of these bats may be unsuccessful in their food supply search, however, they will not
starve as some of their peers will regurgitate a portion of the blood they acquired on that
night, and share it with them. Wilkinson [45] discovered that sharing food by regurgitation,
among wild vampire bats, is a function of reciprocation and it is independent of the degree
of relatedness. In other words, as explained by Nowak [32], if a bat has previously fed
another one, it is more likely this beneficiary re-pays the favor in the future. Food sharing
is often cited as an example of direct reciprocity [45, 32], which is another way of referring
to cooperation, the main topic of this study. Here we focus on mathematical modeling and
simulation of cooperation.
The time evolution of cooperation is a subject of fascination for evolutionary biologists,
that finds it roots in the foundations of game theory [42, 26, 3, 31]. Prisoner’s Dilemma
is perhaps one of the best-studied theoretical games that describes altruistic behavior in
organisms. Typically, Prisoner’s Dilemma is formulated as a two-strategy and two-player
game, where the payoffs are determined by years served in a jail sentence. Indeed, the
name of this game is coined from a scenario where two partners in crime are being held for
Date: August 27, 2012.
1991 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 91A40; Secondary: 91D30.
Key words and phrases. Game theory, social networks, small-world networks.
S.M.C. received funding from NSF under grant DUE-0525447 and from ETSU Honors College under a
Research Discovery Position. A.C.-A. was funded by ETSU Presidential-Grant-in-Aid number E25150.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
06
81
7v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  1
4 A
pr
 20
20
2 SHARON M. CAMERON AND A. CINTRO´N-ARIAS
interrogation in separate rooms at police quarters, and they weigh in their options while
the questioning takes place.
According to classical game theory, for populations of players that mixed homogeneously
at random, cooperation is doomed to become extinct [31, 14]. On other hand, more recent
developments suggest that when Prisoner’s Dilemma is considered not just as a time-
evolving process but rather as a spatio-temporal evolving process, there are certain con-
ditions that prevent the extinction of cooperation [33]. In this study we address space
in the context of a social landscape for players of Prisoner’s Dilemma. We consider so-
cial networks with both simulated datasets and a dataset sampled from a collegiate social
networking site. Specifically, our main contribution is to successfully validate a necessary
condition for the establishment of cooperation (see [33] and references therein) against an
empirical dataset of a social network (friendship in a social networking site [40]).
This paper is organized in the following way. Versions of Prisoner’s Dilemma in well-
mixed populations and those with network structure are introduced in Sections 2 and
3, respectively. Models for social networks with small-world properties are discussed in
Section 4. In Section 5 a dataset of a real social network is introduced. A discussion of the
results is offered in the last section.
2. Prisoner’s Dilemma in Well-Mixed Populations
In a well-mixed game, everyone is assumed to interact with one another, homogeneously
at random. Under this assumption, cooperators may receive a benefit b > 0 from other
cooperating players, but cooperators also pay a cost c > 0 for giving out benefits. Thus,
the average payoff for cooperators is b − c. On the other hand, defectors, whom may
only receive a benefit b from cooperators, and whom neither pay a cost nor distribute any
benefit, end up having a payoff equal to b. These payoffs are summarized into the strategy
payoff matrix A =
[
b− c −c
b 0
]
.
At time t we have that x1(t) + x2(t) = 1, where x1(t) denotes the density (fraction or
proportion) of cooperators in the well-mixed population, while x2(t) = 1 − x1(t) denotes
the density of defectors. The fitness vector f stores the expected fitness for each strategy
(cooperation and defection), and results from the matrix-vector multiplication
(1) f = Ax =
[
b− c −c
b 0
] [
x1
x2
]
=
[
(b− c)x1 − cx2
bx1
]
.
In other words, the fitness of the strategy cooperation is f1 = (b − c)x1 − cx2, while
the fitness of the strategy defection f2 = bx1. By defining the average fitness as follows
φ = x1f1 + x2f2 we can write the replicator equations for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
[31]:
dx1
dt
= x1 (f1 − φ) = −cx1x2(2)
dx2
dt
= x2 (f2 − φ) = cx1x2(3)
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This system supports a stable equilibrium, such that (x1, x2) → (0, 1). To see why it is
stable we reduce the system to one equation with a simple substitution, u = 1 − x1. The
reduced replicator equation becomes du/dt = −cu(1−u) = F (u). Clearly, u = 0 is a stable
equilibrium because F ′(0) = −c < 0 (by construction we assume a positive value for the
cost, i.e., c > 0). This implies defection is the dominant strategy (in fact, evolutionary
stable strategy, see [14, 31]) , in the sense that cooperators go extinct, while defectors
become established, taking over the entire well-mixed population. In other words, natural
selection favors defectors over cooperators [31].
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Figure 1. Numerical solutions to the replicator equations for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Densities of cooperators x1(t) (solid curve) and defectors x2(t)
(dashed curve) are displayed versus time t. Initial conditions and parameter
values: x1(0) = 0.95, x2(0) = 0.05, b = 1.8 and c = 0.3.
Figure 1 illustrates the time evolution of cooperator and defector densities, that is,
numerical solutions to equations (2) and (3). The solid curve depicts the fraction of co-
operators x1(t), while the dashed curve represents the density of defectors x2(t). For this
particular numerical solution, we set b = 1.8 and c = 0.3. Also, we started this simulation
with 95 % of cooperators and only 5 % defectors. As can be seen, the density of cooperators
approaches zero as time progresses (i.e., (x1(t), x2(t)) → (0, 1) as t → 30). Even though
the ratio of defectors to cooperators was initially one-to-nineteen, meaning that for every
1 defector there were 19 cooperators, which gave cooperators an extremely biased favor
initially, we still see the defectors taking over the population and driving cooperators to
extinction.
3. Prisoner’s Dilemma in Social Networks
In this section we consider a population of individuals who may engage in a decision-
making scheme equivalent to Prisoner’s Dilemma. In fact, social connections by means of
acquaintanceship, friendship, or levels of influence that can factor in decision-making are
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modeled with an undirected graph (network) 1, where each vertex (node) represents an
individual and an edge (link) denotes potential social ties [17].
A social network provides a landscape where each node plays one of two strategies,
cooperation or defection, and at each time step nodes decide whether to switch to a new
strategy or keep playing the same. The key for these decisions is the payoff per-node,
which is now a space and time dependent quantity. All nodes connected to a node say i,
form its neighborhood, say Ωi. To compute the payoff of a node one needs to account for
all pair interactions (cooperator-cooperator, cooperator-defector, defector-cooperator and
defector-defector) happening in the node’s neighborhood. The strategy played by node i
is denoted with a binary vector vi defined as
vi =

[
1
0
]
if node i is cooperator
[
0
1
]
if node i is defector.
The payoff of node i at time t is given by
(4) P (i, t) =
∑
j∈Ωi
vi
TAvj ,
where A =
[
b− c −c
b 0
]
denotes the strategy payoff matrix. The fitness of a node is the
payoff re-scaled by an intensity of selection parameter w, such that 0 < w < 1. When
w → 0 there is weak selection, while w → 1 denotes strong selection [33]. Thus, we say the
fitness of node i at time t is defined as follows:
F (i, t) = 1− w + wP (i, t),
where the functional form of F is known as linear fitness (see [20, 33]).
The time evolution of Prisoner’s Dilemma in a social network of players is subject to an
updating rule. In this study we considered the so-called “death-birth” updating [33]: at
each time step a node is chosen uniformly at random (unbiased) to die and its neighbors
compete proportional to their fitness. Once this dying node is determined it becomes
temporarily empty. This action may also be seen not necessarily as an actual death of that
member of the social network, but rather as if that node becomes a free-agent and is open
to be persuaded into playing other strategies. The neighbors of this empty node compete
for it, meaning that the persuasion is proportional to their fitness. Fitness is computed for
each node in the neighborhood of the empty node (the empty node has to be excluded from
the neighborhoods of each of node linked to it because it has no strategy for time being),
then the aggregate fitness for each strategy is calculated. By aggregate fitness we mean the
total fitness of nodes playing cooperation and that of those playing defection. The empty
node decides which strategy to play in the next time step in proportion to the aggregate
1The words graph and network, vertex and node, and edge and link will be used interchangeably.
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fitness of cooperation and defection. (See appendix for additional details in pseudo code
form.)
The ratio of benefit to cost serves as a threshold quantity that determines persistence
of cooperation. When this ratio is compared to the average degree of the network, average
number of edges per node, denoted by 〈k〉, one obtains that
(5)
b
c
> 〈k〉
is a necessary condition for selection to favor cooperation. This threshold result is derived
from combining pair approximations and diffusion approximations [33], where the fixation
probability of a strategy is calculated. This latter quantity represents the probability that
a single player of a strategy (either cooperation or defection) which starts in a uniformly
at random position in the network (unbiased), then gives rise to a lineage of players of the
same strategy, invading the whole population (see supplemental materials of [33]).
In contrast to the well-mixed case, where for any values b, c > 0 one obtains that the
density of defectors always approaches one, x2(t)→ 1 as t gets large, for populations with
structure, such as those with social network ties, it is seen that cooperation is not doomed to
be outcompeted. Clusters of cooperators can persist, provided some conditions are satisfied
(with death-birth update using aggregate fitness per strategy and when b/c > 〈k〉). In this
study we intend to illustrate this feature using both synthetic data and a dataset of a real
social network. The former are generated using Watts-Strogatz algorithm for small-world
networks, to be discussed in the next section.
4. Models of Social Networks: Small-World Phenomenon and
Watts-Strogatz Network Model
Imagine we consider the following conditions for an experiment on a social network.
Randomly selected seed individuals are asked to forward a letter with the ultimate goal
of reaching a target recipient who resides in Sharon, Massachusetts. Even though seed
individuals are given the name, address, and occupation of the target person, they are
required to only pass the letter along to someone in their circle of acquaintances that they
know by their first-name. S. Milgram [27] was the designer of this experiment which resulted
in measuring the average number of intermediaries in these forwarding-letter chains: on
average it took six individuals from seed to target for the letter to arrive in Sharon, MA
(see [27] and chapter 20 of [14]).
This became known as the “small-world phenomenon” and it speaks to structural prop-
erties of networks, where distance between nodes is measured in terms of edges. More
precisely, paths are the concatenation of edges that connect a seed node to a target
node, the discovery of Milgram’s experiment would translate in saying that on average
the forwarding-letter paths consisted of six edges, indeed a short path [27, 43, 44].
Watts and Strogatz [43] proposed a model to construct families of networks with short
paths, while also keeping track of an additional feature called clustering. The latter refers
to the existence of close triads or triangles, which denotes the ability of neighbors of
neighbors to also be connected to each other by means of homophily (nodes connecting to
6 SHARON M. CAMERON AND A. CINTRO´N-ARIAS
(a)$
p
=
0
.0
p
=
0
.1
p
=
1
.0
0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85
 
Density of cooperators at stopping time
(b)$
p=0.0
Density of cooperators at stopping time
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90
0
5
1
0
2
0
p=0.1
Density of cooperators at stopping time
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
0
5
1
5
2
5
p=1.0
Density of cooperators at stopping time
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
0
5
1
5
2
5
(c)$
Figure 2. Prisoner’s Dilemma on small-world networks obtained with
rewiring probability values set to p = 0.0, p = 0.1, and p = 1.0. Panel
(a) displays the density of cooperators versus time, for 10 realizations with
stopping time equal to 7.00× 104. Panel (b) portrays boxplots, while Panel
(c) displays frequency histograms, of the density of cooperators with stop-
ping time of 1.00× 106, for 100 realizations. Network and game parameter
values: n = 1000, 〈k〉 = 4, b = 1.8, c = 0.3 and w = 0.5.
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other nodes who resemble themselves). Watts-Strogatz network model transitions between
two regimes: regular graphs, known to have high levels of clustering; and random graphs,
known to have small characteristic path lengths. Gradual increments in the level of disorder
are parametrized by a tuning quantity: the probability of rewiring existing edges in a
network with a fixed number of nodes, denoted by p where 0 < p < 1. Commonly, Watts-
Strogatz networks are referred to as small-world networks (additional details can be found
in [13, 14, 29, 43, 44] and references therein).
Our interest in the small-world networks relies in using them as a theoretical control
group in the context of Prisoner’s Dilemma. More concretely, we are going to simulate
Prisoner’s Dilemma using networks generated with the Watts-Strogatz algorithm. In this
way, we simulate social influence by means of small-world networks while the theoretical
game evolves in time.
Parameter values. Networks of size n = 1000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4 were
employed. The Prisoner’s Dilemma parameter values were chosen equal to those used in
well-mixed populations for illustrations purposes (see Figure 1): b = 1.8, c = 0.3. We
decided to set the intensity of selection to a medium level (w = 0.5) between strong
(w = 1) and weak (w = 0) selection. Rewiring probabilities were set at three different
values: p = 0.0 (regular graph), p = 0.1 (graphs with large clustering coefficients and small
characteristic path length), and p = 1.0 (random graphs).
Initial conditions. Simple Random Sampling (SRS) was used to determine initial
conditions in the following sense. Nodes were initially set to be cooperators or defectors
without preference (by means of SRS) due to degree, clustering, path length, or any other
network attribute. On the other hand, the number of nodes playing each strategy was cho-
sen uniformly at random, with the only constraint that total population remains constant
at n = 1000.
Stopping time and realizations. A stopping time of T = 1 × 106 was employed. A
total of 100 stochastic realizations of Prisoner’s Dilemma were carried out for a fixed value
of rewiring probability p. A network was drawn from Watts-Strogatz algorithm, with each
fixed value of p, which was kept static during time steps t = 1 through t = T (i.e., over the
course of one stochastic realization of the theoretical game).
Update rule. A death-birth updating rule was implemented (see Section 3), such that
b/c exceeds the average degree: b/c = 1.8/0.3 = 6 and 〈k〉 = 4. This necessary condition
for the establishment of cooperation is precisely what we intend to validate with the present
study.
Figure 2(a) displays a snapshot of the density of cooperators versus time, i.e., x1(t)
versus t. For the sake of resolution only 10 realizations are displayed with time between
t = 1 and t = 70000, where each discrete time step t represents a round of the game
being played. Left-side, middle, and right-side figures in Figure 2(a) depict time series
corresponding to p = 0.0, p = 0.1, and p = 1.0, respectively.
Figures 2(b)–(c) summarize results of 100 realizations where the stopping time is T =
1 × 106. In Figure 2(b) we find boxplots of x1(T ), while Figure 2(c) displays histograms
of x1(T ) for the three values of rewiring under consideration. Across these three types
of rewiring we observe a consistent unimodal shape of the distributions of 100 samples,
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Table 1. Mean and five-number summary of density of cooperators at
stopping time, for 100 realizations of Prisoner’s Dilemma on small-world
networks (see caption of Figure 2).
Rewiring Minimum First Quartile Median Mean Third Quartile Maximum
p = 0.0000 0.7040 0.7725 0.7935 0.7969 0.8200 0.8730
p = 0.1000 0.5920 0.6498 0.6805 0.6785 0.7010 0.7630
p = 1.0000 0.5850 0.6368 0.6595 0.6580 0.6800 0.7360
where no particular skewness is observed. In fact, consistent with the lack of skewness
the variability in the samples does not seem to fluctuate drastically and no outliers are
included either.
The mean along with the five-number summary of x1(T ) are specified in Table 1. For
each value of p, the mean and median are fairly close to one another, such that they
match when round off to one decimal digit. In a community with regular graph structure,
p = 0.0, the median fraction of cooperators at stopping time is 0.7935 with interquartile
range (IQR) of 0.0475. Simulated communities with high levels of clustering and small
average distance between nodes, p = 0.1, exhibit a median of x1(T ) equal to 0.6805 with
IQR equal to 0.0513. On the other hand, in communities with simulated random graph
structure, the median and IQR of x1(T ) are equal to 0.6595 and 0.0433, respectively. The
values of IQR in these three cases confirm what is observed in Figure 2(b)–(c), i.e., no
strong fluctuations in variability of x1(T ) samples is noticed.
We now use the median to comment on average behavior of Prisoner’s Dilemma time
evolution, among simulated social networks (communities). It is well-known that Watts-
Strogatz algorithm provides families of networks at p = 0.1 that have favorable local and
global features. At this value of rewiring, networks have small average characteristic path
lengths (global property) and large clustering coefficients (local property) [43]. The median
of x1(T ) drops substantially from p = 0.0 to p = 0.1 (see Figure 2(b) and Table 1): a drop
of basically 1.0×10−1. On the other hand, while the median of x1(T ) decreases again from
p = 0.1 to p = 1.0, it is not as drastically as in the previous case.
The comparison of Prisoner’s Dilemma across two extremes of small-world networks, top
versus bottom bloxplot in Figure 2(b), suggests the coverage of cooperators in the simulated
communities drops from 80% to 66%. In other words, structure plays a role in the final
number of cooperators at stopping time. In a more general sense, these boxplots in Figure
2(b) confirm that clusters of cooperators persist in these simulated social networks over
time. The choice of stopping time at T = 1×106 guarantees a burn-in phase. Longitudinal
trends of x1(t) with t exceeding 5 × 105 (not displayed here) assure a steady-state-like
behavior.
A closer examination of the solid curve displayed in Figure 1, along with the realizations
of Figure 2(a), leads to compare Prisoner’s Dilemma on well-mixed communities versus
small-world networks. As it was discussed in Section 3, for social networks with b/c > 〈k〉
cooperators are not condemned to extinction, unlike in well-mixed populations. The same
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parameter values were used in the numerical solutions of Figure 1 and the simulations of
Figure 2(a): b = 1.8 and c = 0.3. We see in Figure 1 that after 25 rounds of the game,
cooperators basically disappear in a well-mixed community, while Figure 2 illustrates a
sustained persistence of cooperators over time.
5. Dataset of a Social Network and Simulated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen the rise and establishment of readily
accessible technology to communicate with others simply by hitting a key stroke in a mobile
device, whether it is a laptop, a smartphone, or a tablet. The World Wide Web continues
to host the so-called “social networking sites” (SNS). These are the up-to-date versions
of forums that facilitate exchanges which are remarkably casual and informal, occurring
remotely in real-time.
According to Boyd and Ellison [5] SNS are web-based tools that accomplish three main
objectives: (1) easy development of a profile with the option of making it public; (2)
intuitive interface for constructing lists of users to connect with; (3) access to lists of users
sharing a connection.
Today, one of the well established SNS is Facebook2, where users easily share personal
information by means of photos, videos, and email. Facebook also facilitates surveying
opinions on topics of specific interest and it is known to even promote organization of
events. In the early days Facebook membership was restricted to university affiliation. In
other words, it served as collegiate social networking site requiring users to have a valid
email with an edu-suffix. It first launched at Harvard University in early 2004 and it
gradually expanded to other universities. The email requirement made Facebook users feel
exclusive because they had membership to a private community [5]. By September 2005,
Facebook moved forward to integrate professionals working within corporate networks and
high school students. However, Facebook did not allow its users to make their profiles
public to all users right away. This was a substantial difference relative to other SNS [5],
and it meant that it preserved a strong sense of local community.
Figure 3. Network visualization of the largest connected component in a
social network dataset sampled at the California Institute of Technology
[40].
2http://www.facebook.com/
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A Facebook friendship between two users means there is a link connecting their profiles.
Moreover, for these links to be established Facebook requires confirmation of a “friendship
request”. In this sense, Facebook friendships determine a network of users, in so many
words: a graph of undirected edges, where each node represents a Facebook user. For
examples of social network analyses using this type of datasets see [22, 25, 41].
The dataset employed here is a subset of those used by Traud, et al. [40], it consists of
a complete set of users and all the links between them occurring on September 2005 at the
California Institute of Technology. Figure 3 displays a network visualization of the Caltech
dataset, where nodes and links denote Facebook members and friendships, respectively.
In their comprehensive analysis, Traud, et al. [40] quantify some of the basic network
characteristics of the Caltech dataset. For example, the network size is n = 1099 with only
762 nodes belonging to the largest connected component. Moreover, there are 16651 edges
within the largest connected component. The average degree is 〈k〉 = 43.70, while the mean
clustering coefficient is 0.41. Traud, et al. [40] point out that when comparing clustering,
by two different measures, against the datasets of another four universities, the Caltech
dataset has the largest clustering. In their study, Traud, et al. [40], one of their main
goals is to detect significant clusters of nodes (community structure), by using unbiased
algorithms. They find the Caltech dataset has 12 communities. Using the Caltech dataset,
we carried out Monte Carlo simulations of Prisoner’s Dilemma and below we give details
of the implementation.
Parameter values. Because the necessary condition b/c > 〈k〉 is at the central stage
of this study, we decided to explore the ratio b/c as a linear function of the average degree
〈k〉. In other words, for diagnostic tests we supposed that b/c = β〈k〉 for some β ≥ 1,
where β = 1 denotes a borderline case scenario. Values of β were considered in [1.0, 1.5]
along with values in [2, 10]. Setting initial conditions to 50% cooperators and defectors
at time t = 1, and stopping time T = 1 × 105, led to results displayed in Figure 4(a)
for 10 realizations. It is seen in Figure 4(a) that the mean of x1(T ) is an increasing
function of β, where β ∈ [1, 10]. For β = 1 it is seen that x1(T ) is above 0.1 (at least
10% of the network remains playing cooperation), while for β ≥ 2 then x1(T ) is no less
than 0.7 (more than 70% of cooperators remain in the network). Based on this diagnostic
we opted to set b/c = 3.41〈k〉 (a value of β between 3 and 4): more specifically, we set
b/c = (3.41)(44.0) ≈ 150, i.e., b = 150, c = 1. The value of intensity of selection was set at
w = 0.5, halfway through weak and strong selection.
Initial conditions. The effect of two types of initial conditions was also vetted. We
consider the borderline case b/c = 〈k〉 and set the stopping time as T = 1×106. Figure 4(b)
depicts results of 10 realizations. The top boxplot of the samples of x1(T ), corresponds to
fixed initial conditions, i.e., where 50% of the nodes were initially set to be cooperators. On
the other hand, the bottom boxplot corresponds to initial conditions determined by Simple
Random Sampling (SRS), where the initial number of cooperators was chosen uniformly
at random between 1 and n = 1099. The choice of which nodes were initially set to
play cooperation was made independently of any network attributes. Comparison of the
median in these boxplots displayed in Figure 4(b) suggests cooperators reach very low levels
at t = T (but yet they are not extinct, at least on average), something that is expected in
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Figure 4. Diagnostic tests of Prisoner’s Dilemma simulations on a dataset
of a real social network [40]. Panel (a) displays mean density of cooperators
at stopping time versus a multiplier β, where it is assumed b/c = β〈k〉
for β ∈ {1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 10.0}. Dashed
curve denotes variability: the mean plus minus one standard error. These
averages were computed out of 10 realizations with stopping time T =
1 × 105. In Panel (b) boxplots of the density of cooperators at stopping
time are depicted. The samples in these boxplots were obtained from 10
realizations with stopping time T = 1 × 106 and b/c = 〈k〉. Two types of
initial conditions were tested: Fixed initial conditions (top boxplot), where
half of the population were initialized as cooperator while the other half
were set as defectors; Initial conditions by simple random sampling (bottom
boxplot), where the initial number of cooperators was chosen uniformly at
random between 1 and n.
the borderline case b/c = 〈k〉. Even though fixed initial conditions exhibit an outlier for
x1(T ) samples, and some skewness, the variability remains substantially narrower in fixed
versus SRS initial conditions. We opted for setting initial conditions by SRS to allow more
variability in the simulations outcome.
Stopping time, realizations and updating rule. A death-birth updating rule was
employed (Section 3), while the stopping time was set as T = 1× 106 and 100 realizations
of Prisoner’s Dilemma were carried out using the Caltech dataset.
12 SHARON M. CAMERON AND A. CINTRO´N-ARIAS
Table 2. Mean and five-number summary of density of cooperators at
stopping time, obtained from Caltech dataset.
Minimum First Quartile Median Mean Third Quartile Maximum
0.2185 0.7055 0.8381 0.7881 0.9038 1.0000
Panel (a) of Figure 5 displays only 10 (out of the 100 realization) curves of cooperators
density, for the sake of enhanced resolution. There is clear evidence of patterns supporting
persistence of cooperation, as it is revealed in this subset of the 100 realizations.
Another observed feature in Panel (a) is downward-spike temporal patterns, for a handful
of realizations. In other words, the density of cooperators in these cases drops remarkably,
but it seems to return back to sustained levels. Similar patterns of drops in cooperation
density have been reported before by Egu´ıluz, et al. [15] (see Figure 5), and by Kim, et al.
[21] (see Figure 3(b)), albeit with different versions of Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The histogram of samples of cooperators density at stopping time T = 1×106 is displayed
in Figure 5(b). Considerable skewness is observed, in comparison to small-world networks
(see Figure 2(c)). Moreover, skewness is also confirmed by the boxplot in Figure 5(c),
where a handful of outliers appear. The latter suggest low levels of sustained cooperation,
but no necessarily extinction.
The five-number summary and mean of x1(T ) are given in Table 2. As expected because
of skewness the mean (0.7881) and median (0.8381) are distant from one another, relative
to the simulations on small-world networks (see Table 1). Also, the IQR of the samples is
0.1983, implying IQR of the simulations with the Caltech dataset is one order of magnitude
larger than the IQR’s obtained with small-world networks.
Since the median of x1(T ) is 0.8381 one concludes that, on average, clusters of coop-
erators in the network make up at least 80% of the population, over the long run. This
is considered a validation of b/c > 〈k〉, as a necessary condition for the establishment of
cooperation in a social network [33]. Such validation against empirical data [40] is the main
contribution of this study.
6. Discussion
Some of the very first formulations of the theory of games surfaced during the first half
of the twentieth century, when von Neumann and Morgenstern [42], followed by Nash [28],
seeded foundations for a new field of study.
Prisoner’s dilemma was invented by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher at the RAND
corporation in 1950 [32]. Although its original formulation came from the point of view
of classical game theory, that is, with well-mixed populations. Consideration of popula-
tion structure in Prisoner’s Dilemma was first conveyed with lattices or regular networks.
For example, Nowak and May [30] proposed a purely deterministic version of Prisoner’s
Dilemma on a two dimensional lattice. This led to a system that was extremely sensitive
to initial conditions giving rise to fluctuations in the densities of cooperators and defectors
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Figure 5. Prisoner’s Dilemma on a real social network, dataset sampled
at California Institute of Technology [40]. Panel (a) displays 10 realizations
of the density of cooperators versus time with stopping time T = 1 × 106.
Panel (b) depicts the histrogram while Panel (c) displays the boxplot of
samples of cooperators density at stopping time, for 100 realizations of
Prisoner’s Dilemma. SRS initial conditions were used. Game parameter
values: b = 150, c = 1 and w = 0.5. This dataset has size n = 1099 and
average degree 〈k〉 = 44.0. Game parameter values were chosen to ensure
b/c > 〈k〉 [33].
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on the lattice. In other words, their system supports spatial arrays that vary chaotically,
having cooperation and defection shift in their sustained patterns [30].
Regular lattices are often a good first approach while extending a dynamical model
to incorporate space. However, when the structure in the population is determined by
social interactions, such as those maintained by players of an evolutionary game, these
regular graphs are limited descriptions. The role of social structure is better addressed
by employing small-world networks [1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 34, 36,
37, 38, 39, 46, 47, 48, 49], heterogeneous networks [23, 33], and datasets of real networks
[16, 40, 41].
There is a continued interest in exploring Prisoner’s Dilemma on social networks with
small-world properties. In their pioneer introduction to small-world networks, Watts &
Strogatz [43] argued that as the fraction of rewired edges is increased, then it is less likely
for cooperation to emerge (with a Tit-for-Tat updating rule). Moreover, Watts [44] ex-
plains that networks with very shy levels of clustering tend to not enhance cooperation.
Because the establishment of cooperation requires a critical mass of cooperators orches-
trating against defectors, so that they optimize their fitness or payoff by cooperating with
each other. According to Watts [44], network shortcuts can enable a few defectors to break-
through the seed of cooperators, leading to the eventual halt of the once sustained cluster
of cooperation.
On the other hand, small-world networks tend to favor cooperation under a regime
known as strategy dynamics. Strategy dynamics is an approach in which an initial set of
updating rules are assigned in the first round, and for the following rounds players may
choose to switch between, say for example, Generalized Tit-for-Tat and Copycat [44].
For over a decade, efforts in exploring Prisoner’s Dilemma on small-world networks
footprints a growing literature. Here we comment on what we consider key citations, but
we invite the reader to consult an extended list of references [1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15,
16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 46, 47, 48, 49] and references therein.
Even though several variations of Prisoner’s Dilemma (a common approach is to re-
parametrize the payoff matrix, resulting in a matrix with only one parameter called the
temptation to defect) and its updating rule are considered, a distinct consistent message
is prevalent: cooperation can persist in small-world networks.
For example, Abramson and Kuperman [1] argue that in small-world networks with an
average degree of four, compact groups of cooperators are seen to persist. Moreover, long
range edges, by means of moderate values of the rewiring probability, favor cooperators
as they start to reconnect, thus outcompeting defectors [1]. Tomochi [38] discusses how
random connections (rewiring) enable breakthroughs of cooperation among clusters of de-
fectors, leading to an unexpected scenario, where niches of defectors form and do not have
incentives to switch their strategy, thus imposing over cooperators. Hauert and Szabo´ [19]
use the ratio of cost to net benefit of cooperation as a parameter while exploring phase
transitions, between cooperation and defection, in models with network structure. Fur-
thermore, clusters of cooperators persist with diffusion, that relocates these cooperators
to other sites in a square lattice. Hauert and Szabo´ [19] also note regular small-world
networks are even more favorable to sustained cooperation than square lattices. Perc [34]
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addresses the effects of extrinsic stochastic payoff functions, considered as spatio-temporal
random variations in Prisoner’s Dilemma. Additionally, Perc [34] finds an optimal fraction
of rewired edges supports noise-induced cooperation with resonance. Xia, et al. [48] em-
ploy co-evolutionary small-world networks in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game and they find that
social structure collapses with avalanches, by attacking the best cooperator hubs. They
argue that mutation of the wealthiest (as determined by payoff) cooperators may promote
sustained cooperation on a large scale [48].
Prisoner’s dilemma and social networks have been studied using samples of real data.
Fu, et al. [16], analyze a dataset sampled from a Chinese social networking site, which it is
dubbed the Xiaonei dataset. First, they compute the clustering coefficient and character-
istic path length, and conclude this dataset has small-world properties. Second, Fu, et al.
[16], explain that the evolution of cooperation in a Xiaonei dataset, is influenced by several
social network attributes, including: average connectivity, small-world effect, and degree-
degree correlations. Their numerical simulations of Prisoner’s Dilemma on the Xiaonei
dataset suggest cooperation is substantially promoted, whenever the temptation-to-defect
parameter remains bounded, between 1.00 and 1.35.
The contribution by Fu, et al. [16], shares similarities with this study. Because here
we also employ a dataset sampled from a social networking site along with simulations of
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
This study was inspired mainly by the contributions of Ohtsuki, et al. [33], and Fu, et al.
[16]. The former conveys the cooperation probability of fixation. That is, the probability
that a single cooperator, located in a random node of the network, in fact, converts the en-
tire population from defectors into cooperators. A network of size n, according to [33], has
defectors with a fixation probability below 1/n and it has cooperators with a fixation prob-
ability above 1/n, provided that ratio of benefit to cost exceeds the average connectivity. In
symbols, we write b/c > 〈k〉 and note this condition is necessary for cooperators to be fa-
vored by selection (this inequality is derived by applying pair and diffusion approximations
under the assumption that n is considerably larger than 〈k〉). Another interpretation of
the discovery found by Ohtsuki, et al. [33], is that natural selection promotes cooperation,
with higher likelihood, when there are fewer connections.
On the other hand, Fu, et al. [16], analyzed a dataset of a real social network. They em-
ployed a sample of a friendship network, from a social networking site in China. According
to their simulations of Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperation can reach as much as 80% of the
network, for a range of values of the temptation to defect parameter. Moreover, Fu, et al.
[16], argued that degree heterogeneity is fundamental for the establishment of cooperation
in friendship networks.
Here we have confirmed that cooperation may persist among social networks, provided
some conditions are guaranteed. First, to draw a comparison, we simulate Prisoner’s
Dilemma on well-mixed populations and confirm that cooperation goes extinct regardless
of any values of benefit b and cost c. Then, to contrast the well-mixed scenario, we examine
the persistence of cooperation with simulated social networks and with a dataset of a real
social network. Prisoner’s dilemma was studied in simulated networks between the two
extremes of small-world structures, that is, between regular graphs and random graphs,
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i.e., with rewiring p = 0 and p = 1, respectively. Cooperation keeps sustained levels in both
types of simulated social structures, with median levels of 80% in regular graphs and 66%
in random graphs. The skewness evidenced in the boxplots of the samples of cooperator
density, suggests that despite the fourteen percent drop in the median levels of sustained
cooperation, extinction is not a common occurrence. We must note that the simulations on
well-mixed and small-world populations were carried out using the same game parameter
values: b = 1.8, c = 0.3 and w = 0.5. The average degree in the simulated networks was
set to 〈k〉 = 4, which means that b/c = 6 > 4 = 〈k〉.
Furthermore, cooperation persists among a real social network. The latter determined by
a snapshot sample of a friendship network, in a collegiate social networking site, during its
early days when there were domain restrictions for members [40]. Simulations evidencing
cooperation persistence were carried out with parameter values that satisfied the condition
b/c > 〈k〉. This serves as a validation of the main result by Ohtsuki, et al. [33], against
a dataset of a real social network. In fact, the median of sustained cooperation reaches
84% of the social network. Albeit some variability, it is clear that cooperation among the
facebook friendship network explored here draws a substantial contrast with a well-mixed
population.
We end with a note on further potential future directions of social network analysis
and game theory. More and more the field of mathematical epidemiology is integrating
techniques from evolutionary game theory, in the context of vaccination and behavioral
changes [4, 9, 35]. For example, those vaccinating on-time can be considered cooperators,
while those who do not vaccinate can obtain the benefit of heard immunity, and may be
considered defectors. Studies involving datasets of real social networks can shed some new
light, when considering a game theoretic approach to control epidemics.
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Appendix: Simulation of Prisoner’s Dilemma on a Social Network
The initial conditions are the following. Suppose a network with n nodes is used to
simulate the Prisoner’s Dilemma. An integer number m, such that 1 ≤ m ≤ n, is sampled
uniformly at random from (1, n). Thus, m nodes are selected uniformly at random in the
network and are set with strategy D, while all the other ones are set with strategy C.
(1) Choose one dying node uniformly at random, say it is node i.
(2) Compute the neighborhood of the dying node, say Ωi.
(3) Compute the payoff and fitness of every node j ∈ Ωi.
(4) Compute the aggregate fitness in Ωi for each strategy:
(a) aggregate fitness of all C-players in Ωi, say FC .
(b) aggregate fitness of all D-players in Ωi, say FD.
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(5) Let the empty site (dying node) adopt a strategy proportional to aggregate fitness.
Suppose α = min(FC , FD) and β = max(FC , FD). Consider the following cases.
(a) Case 1: α, β > 0. Sample y ∼ Uniform(0, α + β). If y ≤ α then the empty
site adopts the strategy associated with α, i.e., it adopts C if α = FC or D if
α = FD. Otherwise the dying node adopts the strategy associated with β.
(b) Case 2: α, β < 0. Sample y ∼ Uniform(α+ β, 0). If β ≤ y < 0 then the empty
site adopts the strategy associated with β. Otherwise it adopts the strategy
associated with α.
(c) Case 3: α < 0 and β > 0. Sample y ∼ Uniform(α, β). If α ≤ y < 0, then the
dying node adopts the strategy associated with α. Otherwise it adopts the
strategy associated with β.
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